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Abstract: Previous research has indicated a surprising statistically significant impact on the
local economy in the city that wins the Super Bowl. An analysis of personal income growth in
victorious Super Bowl cities from 1972-2000 cannot further confirm these results, finding no
statistically significant effect on the local economies of these cities. 
JEL Classification Codes: L83 - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism; R53 - Public Facility
Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock1
Introduction
Professional sports are big business in the United States. If the popular media is to be
believed, the championship games of the major professional leagues such as Major League Soccer’s
MLS Cup, the National Basketball Association (NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL) Finals,
Major League Baseball’s (MLB) World Series, and the National Football League’s (NFL) Super
Bowl generate huge profits for the metropolitan areas lucky enough to host these events.
Numerous scholars have attempted to estimate the impact of large sporting events and league
championships on host cities.  Baade and Matheson (2001) use employment and taxable sales data
to find the effect of MLB’s All-Star Game metropolitan areas. Porter (1999) uses taxable sales data
determine the implications of hosting the Super Bowl for host cities. Baade and Matheson (2003a,
2003b) use metropolitan area personal income data to estimate the impacts of MLB’s post-season
and the Super Bowl on local economies. In all cases, the economic consequences of hosting these
mega-events are statistically insignificant and certainly much smaller than the figures quoted by
league and team boosters.  The prevailing opinion among economists is that while these sporting
events may be large in a gross sense, because of crowding out, leakages, and substitution effects,
the net influence on the host city is small.  For further discussion see Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000)
among others. 
The one exception to this is rule is Coates and Humphreys (2002).  Their examination of
post-season play in the NFL, NBA, and MLB, similar to all of the previous studies, finds that the
cities hosting post-season play experience no significant increase in real per capita personal income.
In a very surprising discovery, however, they found that over the time period of their sample, 1969-
1997, the city winning the Super Bowl experienced a statistically significant increase of roughly2
$140 in per capita income.  
This result is particularly surprising considering that the Super Bowl, unlike the
championships in the other major professional sports, hockey, basketball, and baseball, is held at a
pre-determined neutral site rather than at one of the participants home fields. Therefore, while one
might predict that the economies in the cities of the other sports’ champions will be influenced by
the economic activity surrounding the actual game(s), in the case of the Super Bowl, the winner’s
home town receives no direct revenue from the team’s big victory since the win will likely take
place thousands of miles away.  In fact, no Super Bowl champion has ever won the big game in their
own home stadium. Furthermore, because of the single-game elimination playoff system, it is quite
possible that the winning team may never have played even a single post-season game at home. 
Coates and Humphreys offer several reasons for their finding. They offer that the result could
simply be an anomaly or the result of model mis-specification or an omitted variable problem.
Indeed, with 28 independent variables in their matrix of sports environment variables, one might
expect at least one case of spurious correlation just based on the law of averages. They argue,
however, that their finding is reasonably robust to the inclusion of a variety of additional explanatory
variables and alternative functional forms.  Instead they propose that the increase is possibly the
result of labor productivity increases in the winning city. “If winning the Super Bowl has a
stimulating effect on the productivity of the fans of the winning team, then the value of marginal
product of these workers would increase as would the wage bill and income of these workers. This
could possibly lead to an increase in real per capita income in a city for a short period of time.”
(Coates and Humphreys, 2002, pg. 298) 
It is curious that only football, and not professional basketball or baseball leads to this3
increase in productivity, but this is explained by the authors by the fact the it is truly football and
not any of the other sports that truly captures the heart and soul of a city and, indeed, the world.
Some might even argue that winning championships might reduce productivity since the resulting
parades and celebrations often result in business closures and because of the unfortunate
circumstance that fan rioting after sporting championships has become increasing commonplace in
the United States. (Baade and Matheson, 2003c)  The questions remains, however, how to explain
this curious result. In the next section, an alternative model to answer this riddle is proposed.  The
paper ends with results and conclusions.
Data and Methodology
The economic activity generated by or related to any sporting event is likely to be small
relative to the overall economy, and isolating the event’s impact, therefore, is not a trivial task.  The
approach used here is an ex post examination of personal income growth in individual metropolitan
statistical areas (MSA) and is identical to that used by Baade and Matheson (2003a, 2003b).
Explanatory variables identified from past models are used to help establish what personal income
growth would have been in the absence of winning the Super Bowl, and then these predictions are
compared to actual income growth rates to assess the contribution of the win to the local economy.
The success of this approach, of course, depends on the ability to identify those variables that
explain the majority of observed variation in growth in personal income in those cities that have won
the Super Bowl. Equation (1) represents the model used to predict changes in income for winning
cities.
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For each time period t, Yt
i is the real income and ∆Yt
i is the change in real personal
income in the ith MSA, n is the number of cities in the sample, Wt
i is the nominal wages in the
ith MSA as a percentage of the average for all cities in the sample, Tt
i is the state and local taxes
in the ith MSA as a percentage of the average for all cities in the sample, TRt
i is an annual trend
variable, and εt
i is the stochastic error.  OTt
i is a dummy variable used in certain cities’ regression
equations to specify city-specific events such the significant economic influence of Hurricane
Andrew on the economy of Miami and the effect of the oil boom and bust on oil patch cities such
as Denver and Dallas.  
The cohort of cities used in the sample includes the seventy-three largest MSAs in the
United States by population over the time period 1969-2000.  Personal income data from 1969-
2000 were obtained from the Regional Economic Information System at the University of
Virginia, which derives its data from the Department of Commerce statistics. Data regarding
state and local taxes as a percentage of state GDP were available for all cities from 1970 to 2000
and were obtained from the Tax Foundation in Washington, D.C.  Manufacturing wage data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics Survey were available for all
cities over varying time periods.  A complete description of the data is available from the author
upon request.
For the purposes of this analysis, the functional form is linear in all the variables included
in equation (1).  The equation was estimated for 14 different metropolitan areas representing all
of the cities that have won at least one Super Bowl since 1969.  Not every variable specified in
equation (1) emerged as statistically significant for every city.  The decision of whether to
include an independent variable known to be a good predictor in general but failing to be5
statistically significant in a particular city’s case is largely an arbitrary one.  The inclusion of
theoretically valuable variables that are idiosyncratically insignificant will improve some
measures of fit such as R-squared but may reduce other measures such as adjusted R-squared or
the standard error of the estimate.  Since the purpose of equation (1) is to produce predictive
rather than explanatory results, variables were included in the regression equation as long as they
improved predictive success.  Table 1 presents the regression results for all cities with the
combination of variables that minimizes the standard error of the estimate (SEE).  For about half
of the cities, autocorrelation was identified as a significant problem, and, therefore, the
Cochrane-Orcutt method was used for cities where its use again reduced the SEE.
Results
The model identified in Table 1 for each city is used to estimate income growth for each
city for each year that data are available, 1969-2000.  City-specific wage data are not available
for all cities prior to 1972, and therefore only the Super Bowl winners since 1972 are examined. 
This leaves 12 cities and 29 championships in the data set.
Once income growth is estimated by the model, the predicted income growth is then
compared to the actual income growth that each MSA experienced during the year(s) in which it
won the Super Bowl.  If it is assumed that any difference between actual and predicted income
can be accounted for by winning the Super Bowl, this method allows for an estimate of the
impact of the game on victorious cities. Table 2 shows the winning city, predicted growth,
estimated growth, the difference between predicted and actual growth (the residual), and the
standardized residual.  In an effort to compare these results in a meaningful way to the results of6
Coates and Humprheys, the real per capita income (in 2000 dollars) and the change in the per
capita income above or below predictions are shown.  It is important to note that this model was
not designed to directly calculate changes in per capita personal income.  Instead changes in per
capita income are inferred from the change in total personal income, and so it must be assumed
that winning the Super Bowl has no effect on population growth in an MSA for these figures to
have validity. If a win in the Super Bowl spurs migration into the city, then the figures in Table 2
actually overstate the increase in real per capita income.  Only if the Super Bowl win induces
residents to flee the city over the course of the year, a highly unlikely scenario, do the
calculations understate the true per capita income gains. 
The statistics recorded in Table 2 suggest two things worth noting.  First, the dollar
differences recorded in the final column vary substantially with some cities exhibiting per capita
income gains nearly $1,000 in excess of model predictions, and other cities showing a large
negative impact.  Second, actual and predicted growth on average are almost exactly the same
with actual income growth exceeding predicted growth by 0.169 percent. Again assuming no
effect from the Super Bowl on population growth, real per capita income rose by just under $50
on average, a figure roughly one-third that estimated by Coates and Humphreys.
The magnitude of the variation of the estimates at first blush appears high. The
explanation for this range of estimates is simply that the models do not explain all the variation
in estimated income, and, therefore, not all the variation can be attributable to winning the Super
Bowl.  In short, there are omitted variables.  While the model fit statistics for the individual city
regressions display moderately high R-squared numbers, the standard error of the estimate for
the typical city is roughly one percent meaning that one would expect the models to predict7
actual economic growth for the cities within one percentage point about two-thirds of the time.
Given the size of these large, diverse economies, the effect of even a large event with hundreds
of millions of dollars of potential impact is likely to be obscured by natural, unexplained
variations in the economy. Indeed, none of the standardized residuals are statistically significant
at the 5% level.
While it is unlikely that the models for any individual city will capture the effects of even
a potentially large occasion like winning the Super Bowl, one would expect that across a large
number of cities and years, any event that produces a big impact would emerge on average as
statistically significant. Using the seemingly unrelated regressions approach, one can compare
the standardized residuals for the 29 observations with residuals being normally distributed with
a standard deviation of 1.  A test on the null hypothesis that the average standard residual is
different than zero provides a p-value of 39.5 percent, well outside any range of statistical
significance.
As detailed in Baade and Matheson (2003a, 2003b), the seemingly unrelated regressions
approach can be taken one step further by incorporating assumed economic impacts into the
model predictions. Using these techniques, it is found that per capita income gains of $123.35,
$145.34, and $188.60 can be rejected at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level respectively.
Conclusions
An analysis of personal income growth in the year following a win in the Super Bowl in
the winning team’s home city shows a slight increase in personal income growth but one that is
not statistically different than zero.  This contradicts recent findings by Coates and Humphreys8
(2002) that seemed to show a significant gain in per capita incomes in winning cities. Their
plausible explanations for the gain included both the possibility that the finding was spurious and
a purported productivity increase due to jubilant fans in the city. 
The finding in this paper supports their first conclusion that the finding was purely an
anomaly.  Obviously, additional research will be required to determine which set of results truly
reflects the real impact of winning sports championships on local economies. Based on this
study, however, the impact appears to be small or non-existent. While Caesar may thought that
the way to keep citizens happy and productive was to provide “bread and circus,” winning the
Super Bowl does not seem to be this magic ticket to riches.  9
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TABLE 1
Regression results for Equation 1 all variables included that minimize SEE. (t-stats in
parentheses)

















































































































































































OLS regression used in all cases except those noted by **. The Cochrane-Orcutt method was
used in these cases where the elimination of serial correlation improved model fit as measured by
the SEE. 11
TABLE 2











1972 Dallas  $  20,420  7.614% 7.669% 0.055% 0.047 $      11.20  1.158%
1973 Miami  $  22,989  6.852% 8.358% 1.506% 1.118 $    346.23  1.347%
1974 Miami  $  22,309  0.683% -0.267% -0.950% -0.705 $  (211.98) 1.347%
1975 Pittsburgh  $  20,281  -0.372% 0.425% 0.797% 0.929 $    161.65  0.858%
1976 Pittsburgh  $  21,127  3.304% 3.897% 0.594% 0.692 $    125.44  0.858%
1977 Oakland  $  25,547  5.124% 3.915% -1.209% -1.026 $  (308.85) 1.178%
1978 Dallas  $  24,316  7.309% 9.219% 1.910% 1.650 $    464.49  1.158%
1979 Pittsburgh  $  22,779  0.042% -0.137% -0.179% -0.209 $    (40.75) 0.858%
1980 Pittsburgh  $  22,254  -2.051% -2.791% -0.741% -0.864 $  (164.83) 0.858%
1981 Oakland  $  26,751  1.766% 1.753% -0.013% -0.011 $      (3.50) 1.178%
1982 San Francisco  $  33,652  1.380% 0.702% -0.678% -0.396 $  (228.09) 1.713%
1983 Washington  $  28,386  4.670% 5.261% 0.591% 0.617 $    167.78  0.958%
1984 Los Angeles  $  26,263  6.005% 6.366% 0.361% 0.290 $      94.84  1.247%
1985 San Francisco  $  36,935  4.750% 2.450% -2.300% -1.342 $  (849.57) 1.713%
1986 Chicago  $  27,972  4.315% 3.951% -0.364% -0.458 $  (101.85) 0.796%
1987 New York  $  30,979  3.181% 3.820% 0.639% 0.505 $    197.99  1.265%
1988 Washington  $  34,775  5.876% 6.290% 0.414% 0.433 $    144.12  0.958%
1989 San Francisco  $  40,650  2.854% 2.320% -0.534% -0.312 $  (217.20) 1.713%
1990 San Francisco  $  41,426  1.104% 2.102% 0.998% 0.583 $    413.56  1.713%
1991 New York  $  33,253  -1.395% -1.636% -0.241% -0.191 $    (80.19) 1.265%
1992 Washington  $  34,957  2.593% 2.251% -0.342% -0.357 $  (119.44) 0.958%
1993 Dallas  $  28,708  2.567% 2.920% 0.353% 0.305 $    101.43  1.158%
1994 Dallas  $  29,247  3.972% 4.414% 0.442% 0.382 $    129.37  1.158%
1995 San Francisco  $  41,839  2.526% 4.772% 2.246% 1.311 $    939.71  1.713%
1996 Dallas  $  30,468  4.390% 5.770% 1.380% 1.192 $    420.46  1.158%
1997 Green Bay  $  27,882  3.901% 4.953% 1.052% 1.148 $    293.21  0.916%
1998 Denver  $  34,355  8.067% 7.266% -0.801% -0.608 $  (275.19) 1.318%
1999 Denver  $  35,408  5.938% 5.877% -0.061% -0.046 $    (21.46) 1.318%
2000 St. Louis  $  31,313  2.004% 1.990% -0.014% -0.025 $      (4.38) 0.555%
Average 3.413% 3.582% 0.169% 0.160 $      47.73 
T-stat =
P-value =
0.864
39.5%